I. Findings of Fact

In making its findings of fact, the Court is not limited to direct proof; rather, it can rely on circumstantial evidence because such findings are necessarily an inferential endeavor, requiring the Court to select from "conflicting inferences and conclusions that which it considers most reasonable." Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 167 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Tennant v. Peoria & Pekin Union Ry. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 35 (1944)) (internal quotations omitted). Because the factfinding process "inevitably entails some measure of speculation," such "speculation and conjecture become legally impermissible '[o]nly where there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the conclusion reached.'" Siewe, 480 F.3d at 167 (quoting Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 653 (1946)) (alterations in original).

A determination regarding future events and their probability is a finding of fact. See Hui Lin Huang v. Holder, 677 F.3d 130, 134-35 (2d Cir. 2012). See also Huo Qiang Chen v. Holder, 773 F.3d 396, 403 (2d Cir. 2014) ("whether certain events will or might occur in the future is a question of fact"). However, "whether certain events, if they occurred, would constitute persecution as defined by the INA [Immigration and Nationality Act] is a question of law," not one of fact. Chen, 773 F.3d at 403. A finding regarding future events may only be rejected where the IJ [Immigration Judge] lacks an adequate basis in the record for the determination that a future event will, or is likely to, occur, but the finding may not be rejected as speculative simply because it concerns a future event." Huang, 677 F.3d at 134. The Immigration Judge, therefore, "should take pains to make clear what part of his or her determination is fact-finding and what part represents conclusions of law." Id. at 137.